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As a principle organ of the UN, the Security Council is conferred enforcement 
powers by the UN Charter with regard to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has played a rather 
active role in using its enforcement powers to maintain international peace and 
security. However, in practice the Security Council has creatively assumed some new 
functions which may be doubtful according to the UN Charter: intervening a 
sovereign state with military force for humanitarian reasons, legislating by imposing 
obligations of counter-terrorism for all states, and adjudicating by determining a 
disputed boundary between two neighboring countries. These developments have 
given rise to a question: is it legal for the Security Council to do so? As any other 
international organization, there are some legal limits to the power of the Security 
Council which cannot be exceeded. The purposes and principles of the UN, 
stipulations of the UN Charter, and jus cogens are legal limits to the power of the 
Security Council. Moreover, the “executive” nature of the power constitutes an 
implied legal limit to the power of the Security Council. According to these legal 
limits, some acts of the Security Council are ultra vires which should be void ab initio. 
But in fact, some acts ultra vires of the Security Council reflect the practical needs in 
the present international society, i.e., the complication of the international security 
situation makes it necessary for the Security Council to expand its power. However, it 
is not necessarily conflict between international rule of law and international peace 
and security, so even facing some emergent needs under the new situation of 
international security, by handling properly the Security Council can not only resolve 
problems but also respect rule of law. As a judicial remedy, the ICJ is able to review 
the power of the Security Council through its contentious jurisdiction and advisory 
jurisdiction, which can help the Security Council to reinforce the legality of its acts in 
maintaining international peace and security, and help the UN to achieve its two 
purposes: promoting international rule of law and maintaining international peace and 
security. 
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